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Abstract 
Current differential protection has stringent real-time 
communications requirements and it is critical that protection 
traffic is transmitted securely, i.e., by using appropriate data 
authentication and encryption methods. This paper 
demonstrates that real-time encryption of protection traffic in 
IP/MPLS-based communications networks is possible with 
negligible impact on performance and system operation. It is 
also shown how the impact of jitter and asymmetrical delay in 
real communications networks can be eliminated. These 
results will provide confidence to power utilities that modern 
IP/MPLS infrastructure can securely and reliably cater for 
even the most demanding applications. 
1 Introduction 
Current differential protection, often referred to as 
teleprotection, has stringent real-time communications 
requirements: low-delay, symmetrical delay, and low jitter. 
Furthermore, it is critical for system stability that 
teleprotection traffic is transmitted securely [1], i.e., by using 
appropriate authentication and data encryption methods. 
 
Conventionally, time-division multiplying (TDM) 
technologies, such as synchronous digital hierarchy (SDH), 
have been used by power utilities to provide wide-area 
communications for teleprotection services. However, a 
packet-based approach using Internet Protocol/MultiProtocol 
Label Switching (IP/MPLS) offers increased operational 
flexibility and efficiency [2], whilst still emulating the 
benefits of TDM-based services. 
 
This paper demonstrates and analyses two methods for 
enhancing the delivery of teleprotection functionality in 
IP/MPLS networks: 
 
1. Real-time encryption of an IP/MPLS-based service 
which transports teleprotection traffic. The paper 
analyses the impact of the above methods for both 
IEEE C37.94 and IEC 61850 ± using Sampled Value 
(SV) and GOOSE protocols ± approaches for current 
differential protection. 
2. Compensation for asymmetrical delay (i.e., different 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQV GHOD\V LQ WKH ³IRUZDUG´ DQG
³UHYHUVH´ GLUHFWLRQV GXH WR unavoidable jitter in 
packet-switched networks. The paper shows how the 
impact of asymmetrical delay can be minimised to 
prevent potential maloperation of teleprotection 
relays (i.e., false trips) under certain circumstances. 
2 Validation Methodology 
Figure 1 summarises the real-time, hardware-in-the-loop 
testing configurations which have been used, and Figure 2 
Figure 1: Overview of system used for validation 
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shows the laboratory devices. A two-terminal 400 kV 
transmission line has been simulated using a Real Time 
Digital Simulator (RTDS) [3]. The RTDS supplies three-
phase current signals to two commercially-available current 
differential protection relays (Alstom P545). These relays 
natively communicate using IEEE C37.94 optical interfaces. 
The IP/MPLS routers (Alcatel-Lucent 7705 Service 
Aggregation Routers) packetize the IEEE C37.94 data and 
transport it over an emulated point-to-point connection in the 
wide-area communications network, as described in detail in 
[2] and [4]. 
 
A script, written in the Python programming language and 
based on the software reported in [5], has been used to fully 
automate the testing process. This is essential because 
multiple test iterations are required due to the stochastic 
nature of jitter, as described further in Section 4.1. In order to 
confidently establish whether or not false trips occur for a 
given scenario, the RTDS sends GOOSE messages containing 
HDFK UHOD\¶V WULS VWDWXV (which are obtaiQHG IURP WKH UHOD\V¶
digital output trip signals). The script is therefore able to both 
send commands to the IP/MPLS routers to initiate test 
iterations and to record any resulting GOOSE trip messages 
from the RTDS. 
 
A key component in Figure 1 LV WKH ³FRPPXQLFDWLRQV
LPSDLUPHQW JHQHUDWRU´ which must inject precise and 
repeatable real-time Ethernet traffic delays. This component 
allows emulation of sub-optimal communications 
performance, such as asymmetrical delay. Both a commercial 
device (a Calnex Paragon-X) and a custom embedded 
platform have been used. 
 
 
Figure 2: Laboratory testing arrangement 
3 Real-Time Encryption 
3.1 Impact of Encryption 
As implied by Figure 1, the IP/MPLS routers have been 
configured to create an encrypted service between the end-
points in the two (simulated) substations to transport 
protection traffic. The encryption and decryption is hardware-
accelerated and is only performed at the end-points; i.e., the 
traffic remains encrypted throughout the entire wide-area 
communications network infrastructure, rather than being re-
encrypted at each node. This approach is thereby designed to 
minimise the real-time latency resulting from encrypting 
traffic and implements a true end-to-end encrypted transport 
service. 
 
This approach is known as Network Group Encryption (NGE) 
and involves encrypting IEEE C37.94 traffic at the MPLS 
layer. The AES256 algorithm has been used for encryption 
and HMAC-SHA-512 has been used for authentication [6]. 
 
Table 1, with some results from [2] and [4], demonstrates that 
encryption has negligible impact on protection performance. 
An additional delay of approximately 20 µs can be measured 
for the IEEE C37.94 protocol. No other impact on protection 
functionality was found, i.e., there was no measurable impact 
on tripping times for simulated short-circuit faults. 
 
  Propagation 
delay 
Typical 
trip time 
Bandwidth 
required 
IEEE 
C37.94 
No 
encryption 1.68 ms 28.4 ms 0.2-2.7 Mbps 
With 
encryption 1.70 ms 28.4 ms 0.5-5.9 Mbps 
IEC 
61850 
No 
encryption Not measured 24.9 ms ~5.4 Mbps 
With 
encryption Not measured 24.9 ms ~7.0 Mbps 
Table 1: Comparison of protection performance with and 
without encryption 
 
As noted in IEC 61850-90-5 [7] and IEC/TS 62351-6:2007 
[8], there are concerns regarding the real-time performance of 
encrypted communications links for teleprotection 
functionality. However, as this section has demonstrated, an 
end-to-end and hardware-accelerated encryption approach 
avoids these concerns with a negligible performance impact. 
 
The solution adopted by the IP/MPLS routers includes other 
practical factors such as automated key distribution and 
ensuring that there is no interruption of protection 
functionality during key updates [6]. 
3.2 Relationship to Other Approaches and Standards 
The IEC 61850 GOOSE and SV protocols ± designed to be 
used for protection applications ± are mapped directly to 
Layer 2 Ethernet frames. For wide-area communications 
using these protocols, one of the following approaches must 
be adopted: 
 
1. Use a gateway device to convert between suitable 
protocols, as described in IEC 61850-90-1. The use 
of a gateway is likely to involve a conversion delay 
and is therefore not suitable for real-time 
applications such as current differential protection or 
phasor measurement unit (PMU) data. 
Impairment 
generator 
Protection relays 
IP/MPLS routers 
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2. ³7XQQHO´ WKH (WKHUQHW WUDIILF XVLQJ ,3 and UDP, 
thereby creating so-called Routable-GOOSE and 
Routable-SV, as discussed in IEC 61850-90-1 and 
described in detail in IEC 61850-90-5. This was 
primarily designed to transport PMU data using the 
IEC 61850 data model and protocol mappings. 
3. Use an ³e-pipe´ service or a virtual private LAN 
service (VPLS) over an IP/MPLS-based network. An 
e-pipe is an Ethernet point-to-point Layer 2 
connection, while a VPLS provides a multipoint 
Layer 2 service to the connected endpoints as if they 
were connected on the same physical LAN 
infrastructure. This is the approach described in this 
paper. 
 
Approaches 2 and 3 are compared in Table 2. The additions to 
the protocol stack required to achieve Routable-GOOSE and 
Routable-SV ± particularly to cater for authentication and 
encryption ± are relatively complex. Furthermore, the burden 
is left to each device vendor to implement the protocol stack, 
without compromising security; protection relay vendors may 
not conventionally have the required expertise. Conversely, 
for approach 3, the authentication and encryption functions 
can be delegated to the IP/MPLS infrastructure: individual 
wide-area services (whether Ethernet-based, IP-based, or 
otherwise) can be encrypted if required. Encryption is 
managed at a level which is not seen by the application (e.g. 
GOOSE or other traffic) which significantly reduces the 
complexity for device vendors, system integrators, and 
utilities. This approach also allows legacy devices to benefit 
from encryption. 
 
 Approach 2: 
IEC 61850-90-5 
Approach 3: e-pipe or 
VPLS over IP/MPLS 
Complex protocol 
stack 
implementation 
required? 
Yes, but an open 
source 
implementation 
exists [9] 
No, the complexity of 
the encryption is 
hidden from users 
Each device vendor 
must implement 
authentication and 
encryption 
software? 
Yes 
No, this is provided 
automatically by the 
communications 
infrastructure vendor 
Supports legacy 
devices (i.e., non-
Ethernet 
interfaces)? 
No Yes 
Hardware-
accelerated 
encryption? 
Depends on 
vendor 
implementation 
Yes 
Table 2: Comparison of wide-area communications 
approaches for protection applications 
4 Compensating for Asymmetrical Delay 
Jitter is unavoidable in real communications networks, due 
queuing delays and the use of TDM-based links such as 
T1/E1. Furthermore, for low-bandwidth links, which is 
W\SLFDO DW WKH HGJH RI D FRPPXQLFDWLRQV QHWZRUN IRU ³ODVW-
PLOH´ FRQQHFWLYLW\ JUHDWHU MLWWHU FDQ EH H[SHFWHG Jitter can 
result in fluctuating differences between WKH ³IRUZDUG´ DQG
³UHYHUVH´GHOD\V, i.e., asymmetrical delay. 
4.1 Problem Background 
The process of transporting a TDM-based teleprotection 
service over a packet-based network requires that a buffer is 
used to control the egress of data to the protection relays ± to 
ensure that a consistent stream of data is delivered. However, 
this buffer must be initialised RU ³SULPHG´ with data when 
the teleprotection service is started. Any communications 
jitter (i.e., random deviations from the mean latency) 
experienced during this initialisation period can be critical, 
DQG PD\ UHVXOW LQ WKH EXIIHU ³SOD\LQJ-RXW´ GDWD WRR HDUO\ RU
too late. Therefore, there can be an inconsistency in the buffer 
residency time for the forward and reverse directions, which 
would be present until the service was stopped and 
reinitialised ± which is clearly unacceptable for a 
teleprotection service. If the difference in the buffer residency 
times was substantial, a false trip could occur due to the delay 
asymmetry. 7KLV LV EHFDXVH WKH SURWHFWLRQ UHOD\V ³URWDWH´
remote current phasors by the estimated propagation delay; 
however, this estimation is only valid for symmetrical delays. 
 
A feature called Asymmetrical Delay Compensation (ADC) 
has been developed to address this issue. ADC is designed to 
further improve the performance of teleprotection services 
under non-ideal communications network conditions, such as 
DV\PPHWULFRU³MLWWHU\´SDWKV. ADC analyses the behaviour of 
traffic over time and adjusts the jitter buffer residency time 
accordingly to compensate for errors. 
4.2 Protection Settings Analysis 
For each testing method described in Section 4.3, the 
protection relay settings have been configured as shown in 
Table 3. Note that, for some tests, the value of  ݇ ? has been selected as 0% (i.e., no current bias) in order to 
make the relays more sensitive to asymmetrical delay. 
 
Setting Typical value [10] Value for high-sensitivity ܫ௦ଵ 400 A 400 A ܫ௦ଶ 4000 A 4000 A ݇ ? 30% 0% ݇ ? 150% 150% 
Table 3: Current differential protection settings 
 
The theoretical maximum asymmetrical delay that can be 
tolerated for the selected protection settings can be calculated. 
Figure 3 illustrates the current phasors required for two-
terminal differential protection. 
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Figure 3: Definition of current phasors for a two-terminal 
protection scheme 
 
Current phasors ܫ஺ and ܫ஻ can be defined as follows: 
 ܫ஺ ൌ ܫ஺೘סܫ஺ഇ ൌ ܫ஺೘  ܫ஺ഇ ൅ ݆ܫ஺೘  ܫ஺ഇ  ܫ஻ ൌ ܫ஻೘סܫ஻ഇ ൌ ܫ஻೘  ܫ஻ഇ ൅ ݆ܫ஻೘  ܫ஻ഇ 
 ܫௗ௜௙௙  is the magnitude of the vector sum of ܫ஺ and ܫ஻, which 
can be calculated from the real (ݎ݁) and imaginary (݅݉) 
components as follows: 
 ܫௗ௜௙௙ ൌ ට൫ݎ݁ሺܫ஺ሻ ൅ ݎ݁ሺܫ஻ሻ൯ଶ ൅ ൫݅݉ሺܫ஺ሻ ൅ ݅݉ሺܫ஻ሻ൯ଶ
ൌ ඩ ൫ܫ஺೘  ܫ஺ഇ ൅ ܫ஻೘  ܫ஻ഇ൯ଶ൅൫ܫ஺೘  ܫ஺ഇ ൅ ܫ஻೘  ܫ஻ഇ൯ଶ  
 
Assuming the load current is within the first region of the 
differential protection characteristic (i.e., ܫ஺೘ ൏ ܫ௦ଶ) and that ݇ ? ൌ ? ?, a trip will occur when ܫௗ௜௙௙ ൒ ܫ௦ଵ. 
 
Asymmetrical delay results in an error in the estimated phase 
of the remote current measurements. For a load current 
magnitude of 3900 A (i.e., ܫ஺೘  = 3900 A), a value of ܫ஻ഇ  of 
185.88º or 174.12º would cause a trip. This means that a 
phase error of 5.88º would result in a trip. At a 50 Hz 
fundamental frequency, this equates to a time error of 326.6 
µs (ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ൈ  ?Ǥ ? ?ݏ ൊ  ? ? ? ?). However, for the relays to 
erroneously rotate current vectors by a given angle, the actual 
asymmetry must be twice this value. This is because the 
³SLQJ-SRQJ´WLPHV\QFKURQLVDWLRQDOJRULWKP[10] used by the 
relays calculates the total round-trip delay, which is divided 
by two to estimate the propagation delay in one direction. 
 
Therefore, fRUWKH³KLJK-VHQVLWLYLW\´VHWWLQJVJLYHQLQTable 3, 
an asymmetrical delay of approximately 653 µs would result 
in a false trip. 
4.3 Testing Methodology 
Three methods have been used to artificially create 
asymmetrical delay: 
 
Method (a): Traffic congestion due to multiple circuit 
emulation services (NQRZQ DV ³c-pipes´) 
over TDM-based E1 links, with limited 
bandwidth 
Method (b): Injection of jitter during c-pipe 
initialisation 
Method (c): Clock drift due to loss of synchronisation 
 
Each configuration is summarised in Figure 4 and is 
described in detail in the following subsections. 
 
 
Figure 4: Asymmetrical delay testing configurations 
4.3.1 Method (a): traffic congestion 
Additional circuit-emulation services (c-pipes), with various 
payload sizes (ranging from 64 to 160 bytes), have been 
provisioned which compete for the limited total available 
bandwidth. This results in packet delay variation (PDV) for 
the teleprotection traffic. Therefore, there is a probability that, 
at the instant in time when the teleprotection jitter buffer is 
initialised, PDV will be present which will ³GHJUDGH´ the 
jitter buffer state in one or both directions. This may lead to a 
false trip, as described in Section 4.1. The script illustrated in 
Figure 1 controls multiple iterations of starting and stopping 
the teleprotection service to ensure that the worst-case PDV is 
likely to be experienced. 
 
In practice, critical protection traffic would be prioritised 
above other services through the appropriate Quality-of-
Service (QoS) profile, but PDV can still occur due to a high-
priority packet arriving at a node just after the start of the 
transmission of a large packet from another service. 
4.3.2 Method (b): injection of jitter 
The impairment generator illustrated in Figure 1 has been 
configured to add additional latency to the packet flow in 
each direction, according to a Gaussian distribution. This 
allows jitter, according to the defined statistical distribution, 
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WREH³LQMHFWHG´LQWRWKH(WKHUQHWOLQNFDUU\LQJWHOHSURWHFWLRQ
traffic. Figure 5 illustrates a typical packet delay distribution. 
 
 
Figure 5: Typical packet delay injection distribution 
 
The same delay distribution has been applied to traffic in both 
directions. As for test method (a), multiple iterations have 
been executed to ensure that worst-case jitter is experienced 
during initialization of the jitter buffers. 
4.3.3 Method (c): clock drift 
Multiple nodes in an IP/MPLS network must be synchronised 
± using Synchronous Ethernet (SyncE), IEEE 1588, or 
otherwise ± to ensure that the teleprotection service functions 
correctly. By intentionally disabling this synchronisation, the 
local clocks of the IP/MPLS routers may drift differently over 
time, thereby injecting a gradual relative phase error between 
the two end-points. Therefore, one end-point delivers 
teleprotection traffic at a slightly faster rate than the other 
end-point; over time the phase error accumulates and would 
eventually result in a false trip due to the asymmetry. 
 
This testing method involves disabling the IP/MPLS router 
synchronisation and recording false trips ± if any ± with the 
ADC feature disabled and enabled. In this case, stratum 3 
clocks, with an accuracy of ±4.6 ppm, have been used in the 
IP/MPLS routers. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Method (a): traffic congestion 
For the specified combination of traffic from competing 
services, false trips have been observed in over 66% of test 
iterations without ADC enabled. With the ADC feature 
enabled, no false trips have been observed. 
4.4.2 Method (b): injection of jitter 
Table 4 summarises the results for several different test 
parameters. For each test, at least 10 iterations have been 
performed to ensure that ± where expected ± false trips occur 
without ADC enabled. Tests 1-5 illustrate the impact of 
different jitter profiles. Note that the fixed delay value is the 
minimum total delay, regardless of the calculated value of the 
variable delay component for a given packet. Tests 6-10 
illustrate the effect of varying other parameters: MPLS 
payload size, jitter buffer size, and the number of packets 
sampled by the ADC analysis process. 
 
In all cases, and for all parameter combinations, it has been 
demonstrated that the ADC feature prevents false trips. 
4.4.3 Method (c): clock drift 
Without the ADC feature, it has been observed that the 
protection relays would trip after approximately 40 minutes, 
due to excessive clock drift. However, with ADC enabled, no 
trips have been observed over several hours. Furthermore, 
using monitoring functionality within the IP/MPLS routers, 
automatic adjustments to the jitter buffer residency time have 
been observed approximately every 40 minutes ± confirming 
that the ADC feature operated correctly. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper has described the validation and performance 
analysis of an encryption method and an asymmetrical delay 
compensation method for current differential protection in 
IP/MPLS networks. 
 
It has been demonstrated that wide-area power system 
 MPLS and ADC settings Jitter Gaussian distribution Number of protection relay false trips 
Test Packet size 
(bytes) 
Buffer 
size 
(ms) 
ADC 
sampled 
packets 
Fixed 
delay (ms) 
Mean 
variable 
delay (ms) 
Standard 
deviation 
(ms) 
ADC off ADC enabled 
1 16 8 32,000 1.0 5.0 1.0 7 of 10 0 of 10 
2 16 8 32,000 1.0 3.0 1.0 3 of 10 0 of 10 
3 16 8 32,000  1.0 2.0 1.0 4 of 20 0 of 20 
4 16 8 32,000 1.0 1.0 1.0 3 of 20 0 of 10 
5 16 8  32,000 1.0 0.3 1.0 0 of 20 0 of 20 
6 8 8 32,000 1.0 5.0 1.0 N/A 0 of 20 
7 32 16 16,000 1.0 5.0 1.0 N/A 0 of 20 
8 8 8 1,000 1.0 5.0 1.0 N/A 0 of 20 
9 8 8 8,000 1.0 5.0 1.0 N/A 0 of 20 
10 8 16 16,000 1.0 5.0 1.0 N/A 0 of 20 
Table 4: Test summaries for jitter injection (method (b)) 
6 
communications ± including safety-critical teleprotection 
services ± can be encrypted in real-time with negligible 
impact on performance. Furthermore, the approach described 
in the paper offers operational benefits for utilities and 
protection device vendors: authentication and encryption 
functionality is provided, without requiring a complex 
implementation within protection each protection relay, PMU, 
or other device; key generation can be managed automatically 
over time; and legacy devices and interfaces can be 
supported. 
 
A method for avoiding the impact of jitter in real networks 
has been thoroughly tested using three methods. In all cases, 
even with relatively sensitive protection settings, no false 
trips occur with ADC enabled. 
 
These results will be of interest to utilities looking to adopt 
packet-based technologies achieve a more efficient, flexible, 
and secure communications infrastructure. 
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